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Abstract: Taxes are the largest source of tax revenue today, but the realization of tax revenue has not been optimal. Various 
government policies have been implemented but not yet unable to improve taxpayer compliance in paying or reporting tax obligations. 
Taxpayer compliance is a very complex issue and it also occured in almost all countries. The motive derived from the taxpayer's 
individual self is an expression of the mental attitude towards the tax authorities and prevailing taxation system. This motivational 
posture will cause beliefs, feelings, and interrelated attitudes. This study was conducted using experimental analysis with 52 students 
from Accounting Department at Airlangga University Surabaya. The experimental design used was quasi experimental design Between 
Subject 2x2 with covariate of randomization method. The test results show that taxpayers who have positive and defective motivation 
posture do not affect the decision of intention to behave as tax obedient. The tests of the variables for audit strategy and tax sanction 
shows that only the variable of tax sanction which has an effect  on decision of intention to behave a tax obedient, especially when the 
taxpayer is given high tax sanction. 
 




The development of socio-economic life and the people of a 
country can be proven by the change of tax regulations 
because tax is always dynamic. The tax regulation can be 
further developed so that the tax services can also be further 
enhanced as an effort to increase tax revenues. The first 
phase of tax reform in Indonesia started in 1983 by 
introducing self assessment system, simplifying and 
reducing income tax rate and enacting Value Added Tax 
(VAT) instead of Sales Tax (VAT). The second phase of tax 
reform was started in 2009, directed to the development of 
human resources and the use of information technology in 
the tax administration system. State tax reforms aim to 
increase tax revenues, improvements and fundamental 
changes in all aspects of taxation. Increased tax revenue can 
be realized if the people have high tax compliance levels. 
 
Every country has different  approaches, laws, and 
regulations so that the factors that affect the level of tax 
compliance will also be different (Palil, 2013). Taxpayers ae 
still aggressive to make efforts for their tax evasion because 
there are legal, ethical, and administrative reasons 
(Rahmawati., 2015). Tax evasion by the Asian Agri Group 
was the largest tax evasion case of 2008 (Rahman, 
2008). Tax violations using fake tax invoices had reached to 
Rp. 1.56 trillion calculated in 2008-2014 (Mohamad, 
2014), also another biggest cases such as Panama or 
Offshore Leak Papers which has falsified and kept tax 
documents more than 40 years (Himawan, 2016). This is 
what has occured in the tax reporting until 2015. There are 
only about 29.4% of the number of Individual Labor and 
incomes in Indonesia who registered as taxpayers. A 
taxpayer who has obligation to submit Annual Tax Return 
as much as 18,159,840, but the taxpayer who submitted the 
Annual Tax Return is only 60.27%.  
(www.pajak.go.id). Various government policies have been 
set including the increase in the tax ratio, enformcement 
law, the increase in non-taxable income,  sunset policy,  tax 
amnesty but they could not  apparently  increase the 
voluntary taxpayer compliance. This is also supported by a 
lack of studies that reviews the role of government and the 
various crimes in the field of taxation (Alabede, 2011). 
 
From the point of view of taxpayers, tax compliance issues 
are a classic problem faced in almost all countries that 
implement taxation systems. It seems to be due to the 
reluctance of taxpayers to fulfill their tax obligations. There 
is a tendency of taxpayers to minimize the amount of tax 
payable through tax avoidance efforts and even tax evasion 
efforts (Michael, 2013).  
 
The pattern of taxpayer behavior is very extreme and 
complex in individual decision making so it fails to build 
voluntary tax compliance (Jo Anne, 2012). This universal 
phenomenon is common in both developed and developing 
countries. The tax-obedient decisions are not only 
influenced by economic factors, as well as social and 
individual psychological factors (Peggy, 2016), (Donna D, 
2013), (Donna D, 2003), (Donna D, 2007), (Ern, 2010), (Jo 
Anne, 2012), (Viswanath, 2003), (Ambra, 2015), (Bismark, 
2016). However, the roles and perceptions of the people to 
the government also have an influence on tax-imposed 
decisions such  as financial management beliefs (Tijani, 
2013), (Theresia W, 2015), (Peggy, 2016), government 
accountability (Abubakari, 2013) governmental fiscal policy 
(Bismark, 2016), government-imposed laws and regulations 
(Angus, 2016), perceptions of government corruption 
(Rahmawati., 2015) and bureaucratic mechanisms 
established by the government (Yulia, 2015). Such sustained 
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improvement efforts have not been able to create voluntary 
tax compliance. Tax compliance is still interesting to 
examine, although some researchers have previously tried to 
develop tax compliance models (Alabede, 2011). 
 
Motivational Posture is a new approach in tax compliance 
behavior (Braithwaite, 2003). Motives derived from the 
taxpayer's individual self as an expression of the mental 
attitude towards the tax authorities and the prevailing 
taxation system. Between taxpayers and tax authorities, 
there is a very complex relationship and this is different 
from the public sector because it has strong intervention 
with the government (Jo Anne, 2012), (Adriana M, 2012), 
(Wadim, 2015). This motivational posture will create 
beliefs, feelings, and interrelated attitudes. This posture of 
motivation will lead individuals to become either obedient 
or non-compliant taxpayers. This theory applies to taxpayer 
compliance behavior with the aim of capturing attitudes of 
taxpayers on tax authorities and tax regulations established 
by tax authorities (Tijani, 2013), (Abubakari, 2013), 
(Alabede, 2011), (Theresia W, 2015), (Peggy, 2016). Tax 
authorities have legal legitimacy, but do not guarantee the 
existence of psychological legitimacy to the taxpayer. The 
taxpayer always evaluates the policy made by the tax 
authority and determines the position of his or her attitude 
toward the policy (Donna D, 2003). The position of such 
attitudes can either determinee either the tax rate or the 
rejection of policies that will subsequently affect their 
compliance behavior. Previous research has shown that 
ethics and individual motivation do not affect taxpayer 
compliance, but individual ability itself is influential 
because individuals have good planning alternatives 
(Rashedul, 2014). 
 
In addition to the internal factors of individuals in 
consideration, the tax authorities also make efforts to 
prevent non-compliance taxpayer, among others determine 
the tax audit strategy and the imposition of tax penalties. 
The low level of tax compliance is likely also due to the low 
level of government oversight function. Various government 
policies should be followed by follow-up efforts through 
supervision.  
 
Tax audit conducted by the tax authorities for the taxpayer 
compliance supervisory function fulfills its tax obligations. 
When the tax authorities establish taxpayer criteria that 
include the subject of the examination, they can affect the 
teax payers, behavior to be either obediently or not. The tax 
audit strategy of both random and fixed allegedly influences 
the intention of individuals behaving in compliance with 
taxes (Ho D, 2008), (B. Charlene, 2005), (Viswanath, 2003), 
(Adam, 2007). The most dominant socio-psychological and 
economic aspects affect taxpayer compliance, while tax 
audit, penalty and probability detection, tax rate has not 
delivered good results (Ern, 2010), even tax audits have an 
impact on the behavior of tax-inducing individuals (Daniel 
Ho., 2008), (Ambra, 2015). 
 
When the tax audit happens, of course, it has legal 
consequence in the form of tax assessment letters (SKP), 
both underpaid, overpaid and nil. If the determination of a 
tax audit proves to be underpaid, the government will 
impose sanctions in the form of penalties, interest or 
increases. Taxation sanctions are one the effective tools for 
detecting disobedience (Raihana, 2014b), (Martin, 2016). 
Increasingly high tax penalties are expected to make 
taxpayers unable to commit violations so that the will be 
more obedient. When they make mistakes, they are expected 
not to make the same mistakes in the future. Higher 
sanctions will reduce the number of non-compliance of 
individuals and it can make them fulfill their tax obligations 
(Daniel Ho., 2008), (Viswanath, 2003), (Michael, 2013). 
Taxpayers sometimes encounter a dilemma when applying 
for tax returns, so that ethics, rewards and sanctions have a 
negative effect in building tax compliance (Donna D, 2007), 
(Joel, 2007), (Raihana, 2014a). 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Motivational Posture Theory 
Motivational Posture Theory describes five main attitudes in 
taxpayer compliance behavior. This theory explains the 
mental-self attitude of individual taxpayer that is 
expressively indicated by the taxpayer to the tax authority 
on the prevailing tax system, structure, and procedure 
(Braithwaite, 2003). This theory is applied to taxpayer 
compliance behavior in order to capture the attitudes of the 
taxpayer on the tax authorities and tax regulations set by the 
tax authorities. Tax authorities have legal legitimacy, but do 
not guarantee the existence of psychological legitimacy to 
the taxpayer.  
 
The taxpayer always evaluates the policy made by the tax 
authority and determines the position of his or her attitude 
toward the policy. The position of such attitudes can be 
either determining the tax rate or rejecting the policies that 
will subsequently affect their compliance behavior. 
 
Motivation posture is created due to the taxpayer's linkage 
with the tax authorities and tax policy that eventually leads 
to beliefs, feelings, and interrelated attitudes. The five 
posture of motivation is an important component in tax 
compliance that divided into two parts orientation, which is 
positive orientation to tax authority (motivation commitment 
and capitulation) and negative orientation that depict 
resistance / resistance motivation, disengagement and game 
playing. Commitment motivation describes a level the 
consciousness of the individual who wishes for his own will 
being involved in the mission of tax authorities to maximize 
the state revenues. The motivation of capitulation describes 
the individual who accepts the rules set by the tax authority 
without having to be involved with its mission. Both 
motivations essentially represent compliant and cooperative 
taxpayer behavior, if it is seen from the point of view of the 
tax authorities. The resistance motivation represents an open 
resistance to the tax authorities in any established tax policy. 
Motivation of the disengagement represents a more serious 
resistance to s taxation system. Individuals who have both of 
these characters build their immunity from any policy 
established by the tax authorities, and even they feel 
immune with the law. And, game playing motivation 
represents imaginative behavior that shows as close to the 
system, but they view the tax authorities as opposed in a 
game. 
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Motivational posture includes a belief, intention, morals, 
ethics, and attitudes that originate within the individual with 
regard to the issue of taxation. This motivational posture is 
the integration of trust, evaluation and expectation of the 
taxpayer against the tax authorities and its policies 
(Braithwaite, 2003). This posture of motivation can change 
as the situation changes and conditions faced by the 
taxpayer. When the perceived situation and condition of the 
individual related to the role and policy of the tax authorities 
the better, then the decisions made tend to be tax-compliant. 
Individuals who have positive motivation and defiance-
oriented will certainly differ in decision-making behave 
obediently. 
 
H1:  Intent decision to behave obediently to the tax will be 
higher in mandatory prospective tax payers who have 
positively-oriented posture motivation than those who have 
defiance -oriented motivation posture 
 
Tax Audit Strategy  
Tax audit is a series of activities to search, collect evidence, 
process data and other information in order to determine 
compliance level of tax obligations (RI, 2007). There are 
two ways of audit strategy conducted by the tax auditors, 
namely random and fixed startegies. This random audit 
strategy is random when the level of uncertainty is high. 
Fixed audit strategy is a strategy to be selected tax inspector 
by giving the announcement or priority provisions of 
taxpayers to be examined. The selected tax strategy is 
influenced by the possibility of increased income, the 
existence of alleged non-adherence, the utilization of 
taxpayer's historical information, found evidence of fraud or 
dishonesty in tax reporting. 
 
There are several reasons of potential taxpayers to be 
examined, among others: overpayment in annual tax return 
(SPT) with the consequences of taxpayer filed restitution, 
tax returns and taxpayers to compensate, annual tax return 
(SPT) is not accepted or not submitted, taxpayers meet the 
selection criteria and there are complaints from the public. 
In addition, to meet other objectives that tend to tax, the 
inspectors will perform a fixed audit strategy such as Giving 
Tax ID Number (NPWP) or deletion of tax ID number 
(NPWP), Collection of materials to compile Norms Net 
Income Calculation, VAT Centralization, Determination of 
remote taxpayers and Matching data or tool description. 
 
When the taxpayer belongs to the taxpayer of other purposes 
or in the effort of restitution, the tax inspector tends to 
perform a fixed audit strategy. The taxpayer under these 
conditions is likely to be better prepared for the tax 
examiner later on, so it is unlikely that the taxpayer will 
make a mistake in reporting or tend to be taxed. Conversely 
on the conditions of random audit strategy, taxpayers feel 
themselves not necessarily examined even the possibility is 
so small that they are sometimes too reckless to report taxes 
are not correct or not obedient. 
 
H2 : Intent decision to behave obediently to the tax will 
be higher in the prospective taxpayers given the treatment of 




Tax penalties applied in Indonesia can be in the form of 
fines and penalties. This tax sanction is expected to make 
the taxpayers prevent from being the disobedient. Each 
taxpayer's tax penalties are differentiated by different levels 
of tax violations committed, such as not submitting SPT, 
submitting SPT but reporting earnings are too small than 
actual, no bookkeeping of invoices, receipt of money and so 
on. The current tax penalty is in the form of fine sanction of 
Rp. 100,000- Rp. 1,000,000, interest sanctions of 2% to 
48%, sanction of increase of 50% or 100%. The problem of 
tax sanction is quite much regulated in the Law of General 
Taxation provisions, namely Article 7 paragraph (1) and (2), 
Article 8 paragraph (2) (3) and (5), Article 9 paragraph (2), 
Article 13 Paragraph (2) and (3), Article 14 Paragraph (3) 
(4) and (5), Article 15 Paragraph (2), Article 17C Paragraph 
(5), Article 17D Paragraph (5), Article 19 Paragraph (1) (2) 
and (3), Article 20 paragraph (1) and (2), Article 25 
paragraph (9) and (10), Article 36 paragraph (1) and (2). 
 
When the tax authorities impose too high tax sanctions, they 
would expect taxpayers not either neither commit tax 
violations nor become compliant taxpayers. Conversely, 
when the tax authorities determine the low tax penalty 
instead taxpayers, the tax payers will feel too lenient 
sanctions and there is the ability to pay the sanctions so that 
taxpayers tend to behave disobediently. 
 
H3 : High tax penalties can increase the intention to 
behave as tax compliance rather than low tax sanction 
H4 : High tax penalties and fixed audit strategies can 
increase intention of be tax-compliance rather than 
low tax sanctions and randomized audit strategies. 
 
3. Problem Definition 
 
Efforts made by the tax authorities through tax audit 
strategies and the imposition of tax sanctions, will certainly 
lead to different consequences on the intention to behave as 
compliantly toward the tax regulation. The imposition of 
high and low tax penalties is also suspected to affect the 
intentions of individuals behaving tax compliance. This 
research was done by using motivational posture approach, 
which emphasizes more on the aspect of individual attitude 
in looking at the role and policy of tax authority. This study 
tries to use experimental testing with the subjects of 
experiments of students majoring in accounting because this 
study still emphasizes the measurement of intention in 
behaving taxes obediently and when students become 
taxpayers later, they are expected to become obedient 
taxpayers. The problems formualted in this research are as 
follows: 1) is there any difference of decision of intention to 
behave obediently to  tax by the taxpayer when the 
motivation is different, 2) is there any difference of decision 
of intention to behave obedientlyto  tax when different tax 
strategy, 3) is there difference of decision of intention to 
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This study is related to intention decision to behave 
obediently to the tax so that it is a laboratory experimental 
research. This research was conducted in a regulated 
situation and manipulated directly against external factors of 
taxpayer candidates. Independent variables used are 
potential tax audit and tax sanction so that it can be 
determined the relation of causality of independent and 
dependent variable. Internal factor of taxpayers in this study 
is the posture of motivation as a covariate factor that has the 
possibility of influencing the dependent variable in the 
intention to behave to the tax obediently. This covariate 
factor cannot be controlled by the researcher, so this 
research is quasi experimental design. The experimental 
subjects used in this study are students who have taken the 
subject of taxation. They were classified as a regular class. 
This was done to eliminate the weakness of experimental 
research in terms of low external validity. 
 
Experiment Design 
The research design used in experimental quasi is between 
subject with covariate and random assignment method. 
Motivation posture variable is covariate variable, which is 
the variable that cannot be controlled in an experiment 
research, but has the possibility to influence result on 
dependent variable. The independent variable used will be 
given two treatments (treatment). Each subject will obtain 
only one treatment level from each experimental variable. 
Experimental Design 2 x 2, namely: the treatment of 
potential tax audit (fixed and random) and the treatment of 
tax sanctions (high and low). 
 
Research variable 
Dependent variable in this research is intention to behave 
tax obediently which is the intention to make ethical 
decisions made by the student as future taxpayer later. This 
ethical decision intent is related to the statement of the 
amount of income tax to be levied. The taxpayer's intent in 
this study is measured by the intention of reporting the 
amount of income tax from each level of treatment or 
manipulation provided. The independent variables in this 
study are external and internal factors of individual taxpayer 
candidates. The independent variable for this external factor 
will be manipulated so that it is called experimental 
variable, that is potential tax audit and tax sanction. Internal 
factor of taxpayer candidate is motivation posture as 
covariate variable. 
 
Table 1: Research Variable 
Variable Research Variable level 





Strategy Tax Audit  
(AUDIT) 
Random Audit (SAR) 







Motivation Posture POSTMOTIV 
 
A potential tax audit is defined as the way that the tax 
authorities consider to audit the veracity of tax reporting 
payable by the taxpayer. The potential tax audit in this study 
consisted of two possible strategies performed by the tax 
authorities that are random and performed on a      fixed 
basis. The manipulation done in this experimental research 
is by providing information about the audit strategy 
undertaken. Tax sanctions are defined as sanctions in the 
form of penalties and penalties that will be imposed to the 
taxpayer when the taxpayer to make tax reporting errors. 
Manipulation is done by providing information to the 
subject of various tax sanctions ranging from fine, interest 
and increase. 
    
The posture of motivation describes the mental attitude 
shown from within the individual taxpayer candidates 
openly to the tax authorities. The statement on posture 
commitment and capitulation reflects the positive oriented 
taxpayer. Statements on resistance posture, disengagement 
and game playing illustrate defiance-oriented tax attitudes 
towards tax authorities. The posture of motivation was 
measured at the beginning of the experiment using a 
motivational postures instrument in the form of a 
questionnaire with 29 statements using a 5-point likert 
scale(Braithwaite, 2003). 
 
Table 2: Motivation Posture 
Covariate Variable Total Item 
Motivation Posture 
1 Commitment 8 
2 Capitulation 5 
3 Resistance 6 
4 Disangegement 5 
5 Game Playing 5 
 Total 29 
Sumber: (Braithwaite, 2003) 
 
Experimental Procedure 
Experiments begin with building internal validity where 
participants can follow experimental stages with fun. The 
second stage, is in the form of exposure of experimental 
procedures to be executed. The third stage is a submission 
of questionnaire of geographic data and statement of 
motivation posture from the participants. The researcher set 
the list of questions and it took 40 minutes to receive them 
back. The experimental manipulation stage begins where 
each participant received a level of treatment for the 
experimental variable (between subjects). Participants at this 
stage were required to take experimental media in the case 
or tax scenarios. The time was given to the participants to 
make a decision on the amount of reported income.  
 
Table 3: Eksperiment Scenario 
Tax Sanction 
Tax Audit Strategy 
Random Fixed 
High Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Low Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 
Analysis Technique 
Manipulation check is performed on the data obtained from 
the participants, with the aim of knowing the level of 
understanding related to the experimental procedures 
undertaken. Hypothesis testing is done with ANCOVA 
(Analysis of Covariance). The equation model used to test 
the hypothesis is as follows: 
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Where: 
Intention : The Intention Decision to Behave to Tax 
Audit : The effect of the i-th level of the potential tax 
audit factor  (random audit and Fixed audit) 
Modern : The effect of j-level of taxation sanction factor 
(high and low) 
POSTMOTIV : The regression coefficient of the covariate value 
of the posture of motivation 
ε : Random error 
 
Analysis of the effect of each independent variable on the 
dependent variable decision intention to behave in a 
profound tax is the proof of the proposed hypothesis. 
Therefore, the Pairwise Comparison was one resulting from 
Estimated Marginal Means. However, the placement of the 
motivation posture variable in the ANCOVA step resulted in 
the SPSS data output not generating Pairwise Comparisons 
resulting from Estimated Marginal Means of the covariate 
variable, thus further testing is using Independent Sample t-
Test. 
 
5. Result and Discussion 
 
This study has been done with the participants of accounting 
undergraduate students at Airlangga University Surabaya 
with the total number of  78 students, where it was 
previously as a pilot project at STIE Perbanas Surabaya, 
with the total number of  students of 49. The results of a 
manipulation were checked with three questions and it was 
as many as 52 students  who fulfilled the result. 
 
The first test was conducted to measure the posture of 
motivation of each participant as measured at the beginning 
of the experimental stage. Motivation posture measurement 
result shows that 80.04 percent has motivation posture of 
positively oriented, while 19.96 percent has motivation 
posture of defiance-oriented. The result of significance also 
shows bigger than α = 0,05 which means decision of 
intention to behave tax obedient between taxpayer who have 
positive motivation posture , has no different with the 
taxpayers who have posture of defiance motivation. 
 
The next step is a randomized test of the participants' 
personal characteristics that include genital, religious, post-
graduate ideals and priority expenditures other than food 
and clothing. Chi-Square test results on gender showed 
Pearson Chi-Square value of 0.080. For the characteristics 
of religion, it shows a value of 0.740, on the characteristics 
of dream, a value of 0.744, the characteristic expenditure 
priority, a value of 0.606. All the results of Chi-Square test 
show that the results are not significant. This means that the 
characteristics of sex, religion, ideals, and expenditure 
priorities have no significant differences between cells so 
that they have been randomized and this does not need to be 
tested as covariate variables. The next step is to test the 
description between groups or scenarios where the results 





Table 4: Description Test 
 Tax Sanction 












Std=  1,759 
Gorup 2 
(N= 13) 
Mean=  6,62 




























Meanwhile, the result between the subjects’ effects test with 
dependent variable of tax compliance intention, it indicates 
that only tax sanction has an effect on intention to behave 
obediently to tax, while audit strategy has no effect on 
intention to behave as tax obedient. The influential tax 
penalties in this study is high tax sanctions rather than low 
tax sanctions, as evidenced by the high mean tax penalty of 
7.82 and the low tax sanction of 6.63. 
 
Table 5: Between Subject Effects Test 
Source F Sig 
Intercept 1,602 0,201 
Tax Audit Strategy 475,311 0,000 
Tax Saction 0,670 0,417 
Tax Audit Strategy 3,061 0,087 
Tax Saction 0,723 0,400 
 
Intention decision to behave to as tax obedient or tax 
avoidance act is determined by the intention that exists 
within the individuals The government’s effort to improve 
taxpayer compliance through audit strategies and tax 
sanctions on taxpayers has different results in this study. 
Audit strategies performed both random and fixed for 
taxpayer selection criteria, also have no effect on the 
increase of intention to behave as tax obedient. This is 
different from the government's effort through the provision 
of tax penalties that shows it has a significant effect on the 
increase of intention to behave as tax obedient. These results 
are seen in the test results that show only the tax sanction 
variables that affect the decision of intent to behave tax 
compliance. 
 
The government initial effort to see the compliance of 
taxpayers has been conducted so far through the efforts of 
tax audit. Tax audit is one of law enforcement functions 
toward self-assessment system in order to improve tax 
compliance. Tax audits can be done optimally, if the 
inspection activities are conducted with a planned, 
professional, in accordance with applicable tax provisions, 
focus and based on specific strategies.  
 
Fixed tax inspection on the taxpayers including selection 
criteria has been contained in the tax laws. This taxation 
regulation has become a guide for taxpayers to act and it 
seems that taxpayers are beginning to act cautiously in order 
not to become the target of tax audit. Meanwhile, the tax 
audits conducted randomly done to minimize error or non-
compliance taxpayer. Even these results indicate that 
taxpayers are very careful or do not even intend to do tax 
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evasion. Taxpayers tend to pay taxes according to the 
realization of their income, although what they are paying 
tends to be larger than they should be. 
 
All those government efforts are apparently not responded 
by taxpayers, who are making tax evasion efforts. There are 
several reasons taxpayers choose not to make tax evasion 
efforts when the potential tax audit is done. First, the 
taxpayer assumes that paying taxes has become an 
obligation of every citizen. Secondly, taxpayers also assume 
that so far the government has provided various facilities 
and easiness such as tax amnesty that oriented to ease tax 
payments. Third, taxpayers who are mostly private 
taxpayers, tend not to have staff or tax employees so that 
when the tax examination was found there are irregularities 
would be harm their selves. They will get bigger tax 
penalties than they should for the deviation. 
 
Another government effort to reform taxation is the 
establishment of tax penalties. When the government 
conducts various facilities and tax breaks, such as tax 
amnesty, it is certainly supported by the tax sanctions 
applied. That is, when taxpayers who meet the criteria do 
not report the tax amnesty, of course the government will 
provide severe tax sanctions. High and low tax penalties are 
responded by the taxpayers by doing the intention of 
behaving either obediently or not to tax. This study shows 
that high penalty for tax violation or underpaid taxes 
payable from it, has an effect on intention in behaving as tax 
obedient. However, when tax sanctions are considered low, 
taxpayers tend to be non-compliance with taxes. Tax 
penalties enacted by the government make taxpayers more 
obideinet or scared to make irregularities. Tax sanctions not 
only affect the amount of expenditure, but it also provides a 




Tax is one of the largest sources of state revenues at this 
time. However, so har, the realization of tax revenue has not 
been optimal. The fundamental problem is the low 
compliance of the taxpayer. Taxpayer compliance is a 
complex problem because it involves many aspects and 
perspectives. Several previous tax compliance studies have 
also shown inconsistencies in their results. 
 
This study focuses on the aspects of taxpayer behavior on 
government behavior and policies that are focused on audit 
strategies and tax penalties. This study was done by testing 
the experiment towards the accounting students at Airlangga 
University Surabaya with 52 students who meet the checked 
manipulation. The test results show that from the aspect of 
posture motivation, most participants including positive 
motivational posture and statistical results, show only tax 
sanctions that have an effect on the intention decision to 
behave as tax obedient especially when the government 
imposes high tax sanctions. 
 
Audit strategies conducted by the government both random 
and fixed, have been understood by the taxpayers. They 
assume that paying taxes is an obligation. In that, the 
government has provided many facilities or conveniences, 
and they do not want to get sanctioned with high taxes. This 
causes them to decide whether they intend to behave in 
compliance with taxes or not commit a tax evasion. 
However, when the government cahnges the tax sanctions it 
was responded by the taxpayers. When tax sanctions are set 
high, taxpayers are less likely to not doing tax evasion or 
they tend to report the tax because they ralize it. 
 
7. Future Scope 
 
This study has limitations especially when viewed from the 
way of selecting the participants. When they graduate, they 
will choose to become a taxpayer who owns a business or 
who works freely or who works with an employer. The 
selection of their career in the future certainly affects the 
calculation of tax payable. In addition, this study only 
focuses on measuring intentions not yet fully leading to 
actual behavior in the future. Nevertheless, this study has an 
implication for the government. For the government, the 
characteristics and human nature that exist in the taxpayer 
should be the basis of consideration in decision making. 
Taxation strategies, changes in tax regulations, and taxation 
reforms implemented should be understandable and they 
also should be directed to increase taxpayer compliance 
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